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Power over Spice: The Economics of Dune

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The Sentence That Starts an Economic Problem

Power over Spice is power over all

Dune: Part Two (Villeneuve, 2024) opens with these words, credited to an anonymous Sardaukar. They appear nowhere in Herbert’s novels, yet they read like an economist’s riddle: how can control over a single resource hold sway over an entire economic and political order?

In Herbert’s universe, interstellar travel depends on spice melange, and Arrakis is its only natural source. Spice is fictional, but the arrangement is not: a civilisation relies on an input from one place, while the people who live there do not control how it is extracted, moved, and monetised.

The obvious reading is that whoever holds the planet holds the power. I think the sentence is better read as a question: power over which part of spice? Owning a deposit, extracting it, moving it, and capturing its value are separate positions, and they can sit with different actors. Power in a resource economy therefore comes from controlling positions that others cannot easily bypass, and from deciding who captures the value, not from the deposit itself. Dune is a model of that structure, not evidence for it, so cobalt and nickel test whether it holds.


Where Does Power in a Supply Chain Actually Lie?

Spice has one source and no substitute, so as a Spacing Guild representative declares in Lynch's (1984) adaptation, "The spice must flow." The Empire's ships fly faster than light only because Guild navigators, who ingest spice, can steer them, and computers are banned, so no machine can take their place. Demand cannot be redirected and supply cannot be expanded.

That produces a scarcity rent: income above the cost of production that exists because supply is restricted. The question is where that rent lands, and Dune gives four answers. The planet is a fief the Emperor assigns to a Great House (Herbert, 1965), and that is power over the sands. The Fremen, who know the desert better than any outsider, can threaten the harvest. The Spacing Guild holds a monopoly on piloting interstellar craft (Meyers, 2022), and that is power over travel. CHOAM, the trading combine whose board the Emperor and the Landsraad control, is the Empire's largest single source of wealth (Herbert, 1965). 

The Guild is the most instructive. Its power does not come from owning the deposit. It comes from a monopoly over a step that the whole Empire needs. A position is powerful when buyers have no practical way around it, which means the cost of switching is prohibitive. Where it falls because an alternative appears, the power drains away.

The Fremen show this from the other side. They possessed spice for generations without leverage. In the film (Villeneuve, 2024), Paul gives them some by threatening to destroy production unless the Emperor yields, a credible threat against the one flow the Empire cannot replace. The limit is that a threat that must be carried out destroys the lever it relied on, which is why real producers prefer throttles to bombs. The Fremen are also not a state, so I use them to show a position, not to model a country.


From Arrakis to Earth

Arrakis is a limiting case, with one source, no substitute, and one guild. On Earth, buyers can sometimes build a way around a position, and states can try to climb into one, so the cost of switching is an empirical question rather than a plot device. What carries over is the distinction itself. Holding a deposit, mining it, processing it, and selling it are separate positions, and they can be measured: shares of mined output show who holds the sands, shares of processing show who holds the step buyers cannot skip, and ownership and prices show who captures the wealth. Cobalt and nickel come from the same battery supply chain, and a change in one now shows up in the other (Cobalt Institute, 2026). Read together, they show two states trying to climb toward the positions that matter.


The DRC: A Gate on Someone Else’s Harvest

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) supplied 73% of the world's mined cobalt in 2025, down from 77% in 2024, while China produced 79% of refined cobalt (Cobalt Institute, 2026). Chinese-majority-owned assets accounted for 72% of the DRC's mined supply, and CMOC Group alone operates the country's two largest mines, which together produce about two-fifths of the world's cobalt (Cobalt Institute, 2026). The DRC holds the sands and the border. Chinese firms hold most of the mining, and China does most of the refining.

The two shares have to be read against each other. A 73% share gives Kinshasa something to withhold, but most DRC cobalt leaves as hydroxide, an intermediate that must be refined before a battery maker can use it, and China is where 79% of refined cobalt is made (Cobalt Institute, 2026). Refining is the Guild's step in this chain. The DRC has a lever, but the stages that turn cobalt into a price buyers pay sit elsewhere. That does not mean Beijing sets the terms: Chinese-majority ownership describes who holds the assets, not a single decision-maker, and a share of output is not a share of pricing power. These are also industry estimates, since the Cobalt Institute's report was prepared for it by Benchmark Mineral Intelligence.

Kinshasa used the one position it controls. On 22 February 2025 it banned all cobalt exports, extended the ban in June, and replaced it in October with annual quotas of 96,600 tonnes for 2026 and 2027 (Cobalt Institute, 2026; Maddela, 2025), administered by the regulator ARECOMS. The motive was price: the DRC's export tax follows market prices, so the slump to historic lows in early 2025 had gutted its cobalt revenue (Cobalt Institute, 2026). Through the Fremen logic, the ban was the bomb, a full stop that also starved the state of that tax, and the quota is the throttle, which caps what reaches the market while production continues. It is a tight one: 96,600 tonnes is roughly half of the 200,000 tonnes or so the DRC mined in 2025 (73% of 270,000 tonnes; Cobalt Institute, 2026).

Hydroxide prices rose from about $5.90 per pound at the start of 2025 to $25.25 by year-end, and metal from $10.75 to $24.75 (Cobalt Institute, 2026). Hydroxide, the form the DRC mainly exports, more than quadrupled, and at moments cost more than the metal refined from it. That ordering is what a gate rent looks like: the price rises most where the restriction bites. It shows that buyers had few short-run ways around the DRC. It does not show what the DRC earned, because price rose while the volume it could sell fell.

The sharper question is who gained. A scarcity rent goes to whoever sells the scarce tonnes. Quotas are set from each producer's average output over the previous three years (Cobalt Institute, 2026), so incumbents keep their positions, and with 72% of supply in Chinese-majority hands, the arithmetic points to those owners capturing much of the extra margin. They are not a uniform bloc: the formula leaves CMOC's newest and largest mine, Kisanfu, with a proportionally smaller quota than older mines such as Glencore's Mutanda, and CMOC reportedly opposed the quota system that Glencore backed (Maddela, 2025).

Kinshasa's share comes through a 10% royalty prepaid on each company's maximum quota at market prices (Cobalt Institute, 2026), but how much the state kept is unmeasured. A flat royalty takes the same tenth of a windfall as of ordinary revenue, so it is a weak tool for capturing a rent that the state's own quota creates. ARECOMS decides eligibility and volumes, but most of the quota follows history, and only a strategic tranche of about a tenth is allocated as it chooses. The DRC can move the price. So far it has left who profits mostly to history.


The Guild’s Step on Indonesian Soil

Indonesia took the opposite route. Where Kinshasa restricted how much cobalt could leave, Jakarta restricted the form in which nickel could leave. In Dune's terms, it set out to occupy the Guild's position, the step every buyer must pass through, rather than defend the fief. It held the world's largest nickel reserves (Kee & Xie, 2025), so it moved into the next layer. Restrictions on raw ore exports began in the early 2010s, and Indonesia now mines about 65% of the world's nickel and accounts for 43% of global nickel processing, ahead of China's 31% (OECD, 2026).

The OECD ties a roughly 700% expansion of Indonesian nickel output between 2012 and 2022 to the shift from exporting ore to promoting domestic value addition (OECD, 2026). So the 65% share is partly a product of the gate, not only its precondition. A state with enough of the resource can make processors come to the ore, and Indonesia did. But both shares measure location, and neither says who owns what is now located there.

Processing inside the border is not the same as capturing the returns. A World Bank working paper on the 2014 ore export ban finds that it could raise the domestic value-added ratio of downstream industries, but that the entry of smaller, inefficient firms led to efficiency losses (Kee & Xie, 2025). Value added is measured where production happens, so a foreign-owned smelter's profits still count as domestic even if they leave. Ownership tells the other half of the story: domestic companies control less than 10% of Indonesian nickel production, against roughly 40% for companies with Chinese majority ownership (OECD, 2026).

These figures separate three things that the word downstreaming runs together: where production happens, who owns it, and who keeps the profit. Most of Indonesia's smelting makes nickel pig iron and ferronickel, and lower-grade intermediates are often shipped to China, where nearly 75% of battery sulphate is made (OECD, 2026). The plants are inside the border; most of the ownership and most of the battery-sulphate step are not. What the border bought Indonesia is jurisdiction, not ownership.

Unable to own most of the plants, Indonesia is now reaching for the wealth. Peraturan Pemerintah No. 24 of 2026, in force since 1 June, makes a state-owned entity, PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia, the sole export channel for coal, palm oil, and ferroalloys, acting as seller and exporter of record and setting the export price (ABNR, 2026; Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, 2026). Private exporters are shut out after a transition ending by 31 December 2026. Benchmark estimates that about a third of global primary nickel production falls under this state export control. Tom Price of Panmure Liberum calls it "resource nationalism on steroids" (Spence & Raghu, 2026). The regulation goes after the one position that neither plant location nor processing share gives Jakarta: the point of sale. Its target is under-invoicing, booking exports below what buyers pay so that profit surfaces elsewhere (Spence & Raghu, 2026).

Benchmark's one-third figure shows the gate's reach, not its strength. Strength depends on the Arrakis test, whether buyers can go around it, and the record is mixed. In 2025, Chinese traders stopped buying Indonesian coal when Jakarta pressed a government price benchmark they saw as inflated, until it backed down, although the reporters judge Indonesia's clout far greater in nickel (Spence & Raghu, 2026). Implementation may also prove narrower than the text: a Shanghai Metals Market analysis says the state exporter will start in January 2027 as a document-verification intermediary that neither buys the goods nor negotiates prices (Shanghai Metals Market, 2026). It is too early to know whether control of the gate will become control of the returns.


Around the Gate, Not the Guild

Set side by side, the two cases turn on the same question. Each state holds the deposit, and neither holds the position that sets the terms of trade. The DRC holds the mine gate but not most of the mines or the refineries. Indonesia holds the processing capacity, but its domestic firms control under a tenth of production. Both are now reaching for a gate: Kinshasa through quotas, Jakarta through a state exporter.

The gates sit in different places, and that decides what they can capture. Kinshasa's sits at the mine, upstream of the refining step buyers cannot skip, so it creates a rent on feedstock that lands with whoever holds the quota. Jakarta's sits at the point of sale, downstream of plants that cannot be moved. That gives it a hold over plant owners that Kinshasa lacks over refiners in China, and it is also the more exposed position, because it asks foreign owners and buyers to accept a state intermediary at exactly the point where they earn their margin. Neither state has solved its ownership problem; each is trying to regulate around it.

The cases are also linked by a lesson about alternatives. Indonesia's nickel plants produce cobalt as a by-product, 42.5 thousand tonnes in 2025, or 14% of global mined supply, up from 11%, while the DRC's share fell from 77% to 73% (Cobalt Institute, 2026). A chokepoint weakens when an alternative route appears, and Indonesia's build-out, helped by cheap Chinese capital, is building one. The shift is modest, and the report expects the DRC to stay above half of mined supply through 2040, so the gate is eroding rather than failing. By-product cobalt follows nickel output, so Kinshasa cannot throttle it. The route has a limit, though: about 92% of Indonesia's cobalt is mixed hydroxide precipitate, and Indonesia makes only about 3% of the world's refined cobalt, against China's 79%. The new route bypasses the DRC's gate, not the refining step behind it.


So, Who Holds Power over Spice?

Back on Arrakis, the sentence now has four answers. Power over the sands belongs to whoever holds the fief. Power over the harvest belongs to whoever can credibly threaten it. Power over travel belongs to the Guild that no computer can replace, and power over the wealth belongs to a combine whose board the Emperor and the Landsraad control. Each is powerful only as far as buyers cannot go around it.

The same four answers can be read off the two chains. In cobalt, the sands are the DRC's deposit, the harvest is the throttle of its quota, travel is the refining that sits mostly in China, and the wealth goes to whoever holds the allocation. In nickel, Indonesia has pulled the travel step inside its borders and is now reaching for the wealth by taking over the point of sale. A position is strong while alternatives are costly: the DRC's export gate while buyers lack other sources, China's refining while capacity stays concentrated there. When alternatives arrive, as Indonesia's by-product cobalt already shows, the position loses power.

The comparison also separates three things that "the resource is ours" runs together: owning the deposit, hosting the processing, and capturing the returns. In both countries Chinese-majority firms hold a large share of the assets behind the gate (72% of DRC supply, roughly 40% of Indonesian production), so a state can control a gate without controlling who profits behind it. That is a pattern of ownership, not proof of coordination.

That is why "the resource is ours" is a weaker claim than it sounds. The deposit is the layer a state can most easily claim, and the power sits in the layers that are hard to replace, which states must fight to enter, own, or tax. If the deposit is the least contested layer of the system, what exactly is a country claiming when it says the resource is its own?



References

ABNR. (2026). Indonesia introduces export centralization regime for strategic natural resource commodities (Government Regulation No. 24 of 2026). https://www.abnrlaw.com/news/indonesia-introduces-export-centralization-regime-for-strategic-natural-resource-commodities-government-regulation-no-24-of-2026 

Benchmark Mineral Intelligence. (2026, July 22). A third of global nickel supply to be under Indonesian state export control. https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/a-third-of-global-nickel-supply-to-be-under-indonesian-state-export-control

Kee, H. L., & Xie, E. (2025). Nickel, steel and cars: Export ban and domestic value-added in Indonesia (Policy Research Working Paper No. 11249). World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/fdfc0698-6d52-4fad-a072-cd810039beaf

Maddela, V. (2025, September 23). DRC to lift cobalt export ban and launch quotas from October 2025. Mining Technology. https://www.mining-technology.com/newsletters/congo-to-lift-cobalt-export-ban-and-launch-quotas

OECD. (2026). Nickel. In Enhancing resilience through traceability: Insights from lithium and nickel supply chains in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Chapter 4). https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/enhancing-resilience-through-traceability_a898687d-en/full-report/nickel_a87df29d.html

Shanghai Metals Market. (2026, November 10). [SMM analysis] Indonesia DSI update: January 2027 intermediary model takes shape. https://news.metal.com/newscontent/HQ4GMVKK4IF7WTVKOHTVP7IEO5JP2X35ESFKNPA-smm-analysis-indonesia-dsi-update-january-2027-intermediary-model-takes-shape

Spence, E., & Raghu, A. (2026, May 20). Indonesia’s radical export experiment upends its commodity trade. Mining.com. https://www.mining.com/web/indonesias-radical-export-experiment-upends-its-commodity-trade/


 
 
 

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